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The first thing I need to do regarding Jarmila Bubikova-Moan’s paper is to heartly thank her 
not only for paying attention to my work but most specially for creatively using it in the 
analysis and clarification of her own corpus of real empirical examples in what I definitely 
see as fruitful combination with Michael Bamberg’s (1997) discourse-analytical framework. 
 I find Bamberg’s three levels of interaction, identifiable in any piece of storytelling (the 
story world, the interactional situation and the wider discursive context), extremely useful in 
understanding how identifiable traits of a narrative discourse fulfil specific functions that 
may be particularly relevant for its performance in one or another of these levels. Bamberg’s 
multi-dimensional approach, arranged as well from the most intra-diagetic level to the most 
extra-diagetic one, fits indeed rather smoothly with my own list of criteria for story credibility 
(Olmos 2015) of which criteria 1-3 seem to belong to Bamberg’s Level 1, criteria 4-7 to 
Bamberg’s Level 2 and criteria 8-10 to Bamberg’s Level 3. 
 Bubikova-Moan will originally and rather successfully, use this combination in trying 
to assess the performance of the narratives appearing in her empirical examples in terms of 
their multi-layered credibility, vis-à-vis different audiences or, better still, different positions 
occupied (even successively) by their auditors (e.g. Bubikova-Moan herself, acting as 
interviewer first, and then as academic analyst).  
However, it seems that this should be part of their analysis and evaluation regarding 
their explicitly argumentative function, as this is what is at stake in the narrative-
argumentative conundrum, and if Christopher Tindale’s (2017) dynamic characterization of 
argument is going to be of any use. And here I see some problems arise in Bubikova-Moan´s 
discussions about her empirical examples. She has not found much help in that direction, 
though. My own three categories of argumentative recognizable types (or groups of schemes) 
in which we may expect to find narratives plus the fourth possibility of a pure narrative, 
analyzable in argumentative terms, which she kindly mentions (pp. 3-4), has lately given me 
some thought. 
I was particularly unsatisfied with the fourth category as it might convey the idea that 
any narrative could and should be assessed in argumentative terms. In an unpublished piece, 
I tried, in fact, to subdivide this category into different possibilities, thus: 
 
The second possibility [vs. explicitly “narrative-based argument schemes”] 
focuses on what we could call “credible” or “believable” narration with several 
possible argumentative functions: 
- either understood as some sort of self-standing and self-referring argument 
about its own veracity by means of its “manifest credibility”,  
- or about the credible characterization of an object (in general terms) or several 
objects of discourse (i.e. by framing them, as the term is used in discourse 
analysis), 
- or approached in terms of assuming the argumentative qualities (rhetorical and 
others) of a discourse that does not in fact present an argument. 
 
The idea behind this attempt was, precisely, to prevent hasty argumentative characterizations 
of  narratives… possibly provoked by myself.  
In any case, I should say that in my opinion, Buvikova-Moan makes a rather good start 
when in p. 7 she commits herself to a procedure dictating that her analysis will have to 
answer the following four questions: 
 
1. What is the narrative/story presented? 
2. How is it embedded in the immediate discursive context? 
3. Is there an argument being put forward/what is it? 
4. How credible is the constructed narrative as argument vis-à-vis the narrator’s 
multi-layered audience? 
 
I would be more careful with question 3 and rephrase it as referred more explicitly to an 
identifiable arguing agent and as related to a more conscious definition of argument:  
 
3’ Is the narrator putting forward an argument, i.e. is she offering some reason 
for something else? Which is the reason? Which is the claim? Are the reason or 
the claim conveyed through the story? 
 
But the second question is already very important and could be the start of the argumentative 
analysis in rather dynamic terms (in Tindale’s sense). Answering it should address whether 
someone in the immediate discursive context is already asking for reasons, i.e. whether 
someone is, in fact, expecting to hear some justification for some either explicit or obvious 
claim (that should be identified at this point in the analysis) or is making her interlocutor 
take sides in an issue, or is prompting any kind of argumentatively relevant response (for 
example, by framing the way one should look at a certain related object or agent), etc. 
Bubikova-Moan´s example discussions describe very well the kind of discursive 
activity (the interviews she herself conducted with Polish immigrants in Norway) in which 
the narratives appear but I am not so sure she really gets to emphasize the dialectics that the 
activity itself provokes. Her first example is much simpler than the second one. The 
interviewer asks for the evaluative opinion of the immigrant on a certain issue (lines 1-2). 
She answers it with a value judgment (line 3) and then there is an explicit demand for 
justification of that judgment on the part of the interviewer (line 4). The story 
straightforwardly starts as such attempt at justifying the value claim. Only when it goes on 
and gets lengthier is it put to other uses as, for example, becoming a narrative explanation of 
how she acquired a motivation to learn Norwegian or, when the interviewer seems not to 
believe the story itself or its relevance (lines 22, 24), becoming a testimony in favor of the 
non-bilingual character of the particular child involved (against current expectations). 
Whether the story is credible may be relevant for the three cases of reason-giving 
activities mentioned in the previous paragraph but in different ways. In the first case, it 
suffices that it would have happened as related once: “In certain occasion I could not 
understand my child, so parenting a bilingual child is stressful”. The second and third 
derivations of the conversation are much trickier, as Bubikova-Moan herself admits.  
A self-explanation supposedly based on motivational reasons is always subject to the 
suspicion that there may be hidden (even unconscious) motifs behind someone’s actions and 
that the self-explanation is in fact more like an a posteriori rationalization. Moreover, here 
the immigrant’s very act of self-explaining itself is challenged by the analyst for its possible 
hidden motifs: showing a credible, because credibly motivated, intention to integrate oneself 
in the Norwegian culture in front of someone seen as a public official.  
As to the third derivation, the problem is that here the story contradicts assumed 
expectations and even established theories as to what is the usual development of 
bilingualism. So its credibility as an isolated event is not enough because it could be just a 
case of anecdotal evidence regarding a conclusion as committed as “my child does not 
understand or speak Polish; my child is not really bilingual”. And this was the easy case. 
Bubikova-Moan’s second example is rather more complicated for an argumentative 
analysis. Maybe (I don’t know) it would have been useful to count on the transcription of 
some lines before the ones we have, because in line 1 it seems that there is already a reaction 
to some question or suggestion and that could have helped us understand what both members 
of the couple are trying to show (either jointly or individually). In any case, it seems to me 
that here the woman’s story is mainly a means to illustrate how “intolerance” or 
“xenophobia” (mentioned rather inarticulately by her husband) really work in a concrete 
situation, even in a prima facie rather favorable one. The part of the story where the woman 
mentions the previous discussion with her husband is (in my understanding) mainly giving 
us the antecedents of the specific anecdote to be recounted and depicting the state of mind 
of its protagonist (insecure about her capacity and her possible performance).  
But my feeling is that the gist of what she wants to convey is the prejudice she 
perceives in the clerk’s complimentary but at the same time too surprised reaction. I would 
not be very inclined to analyze this as an argumentative move without taking into account 
the previous exchange to which it seems to me it is reacting. However, if pressed to do so, I 
would try to frame it more as an a fortiori (Marraud 2014; Olmos 2014, pp. 202-203) way 
of reasoning than any other thing (prejudice surfaces everywhere, even if one has the 
linguistic competence she demonstrated in that occasion). I think it is a more sophisticated 
way of using the case than the mere analogy Bubikova-Moan mentions. His wife’s anecdote 
would reinforce what the husband was (rather less articulately) trying to say about the 
impotence felt by the immigrants divided about whether speaking a stilted Norwegian and 
getting dubious compliments, or speaking English and favor expedient communication at 
the expense of reinforcing their interlocutors’ prejudices. 
What I really see is a discursive cooperation between both and in front of a third party 
that possibly connects with previous discussions among them in which they have come to 
negotiate the way they jointly see the situation. But the interesting point is that now they are 
in fact in front of a third party, and the story should work at Bamberg’s Level 2. The aspects 
of its credibility that become relevant are precisely those that would be operative at that level 
and that, I’m afraid, should have to be more connected with the interventions of the 
interviewer that we do not have. 
To sum up. I think Buvikova-Moan’s paper is a really nice piece of both argumentation 
theoretical insight and argumentation realistic analysis practice. I would just advise her to 
follow more closely her own prescriptions which I find unobjectionable. 
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